https://vimeo.com/85816848
Why Europe Failed
Dr Oliver Hartwich of The New Zealand Initiative discusses his new book, Why Europe Failed.
Over the past years, we have become used to Europe’s debt crisis. However, the fiscal problems of countries such as Greece are only the tip of the iceberg. Europe’s crisis has much deeper roots. Here, Dr Hartwich explains the causes of Europe’s decline.
Greece and Its Misguided Champions
From Michael G. Jacobides in Harvard Business Review:
….while some EU policies are punitive or counter-productive, the strength of opinion of pundits long on conviction and short on detail seems to ignore the real root cause of the crisis. This is that the Greek economy has become inward-looking, unproductive, incumbent-favouring, and rife with rent-seeking. They may also underestimate how Grexit would exacerbate many of the Greek pathologies at the root of the crisis.
Greece’s main problem isn’t its currency. Rather, it is that its Byzantine regulations and institutional uncertainties discourage investments and reduce competitive pressures. Grexit would further restrict available capital, shatter the fragile banking sector, and increase the investment gap, which, as McKinsey’s recent study shows, is the key issue.
Read more at Greece and Its Misguided Champions.
A bad case of the ‘nineties
The 1990s featured two significant upheavals in global financial markets. First, 1990 saw the Nikkei collapse from its high of 39000, reaching an eventual low of 7000 in 2008.
The collapse followed strong appreciation of the Yen after the September 1985 Plaza Accord and the ensuing October 1987 global stock market crash. The Plaza Accord attempted to curtail long-term currency manipulation by Japan who had built up foreign reserves — mainly through purchases of US Treasuries — to suppress appreciation of the Yen against the Dollar and maintain a current account surplus.
Seven years later, collapsing currencies during the 1997 Asian financial crisis destroyed fast-growing economies — with Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia experiencing 40%, 34% and 83% falls in (1998) GNP respectively — and eventually led to the 1998 Russian default and break up of the Soviet Union. Earlier, rapidly growing exports with currencies pegged to the Dollar brought a flood of offshore investment and easy credit into the Asian tigers. Attempts by the IMF to impose discipline and a string of bankruptcies spooked investors into a stampede for the exits. Falling exchange rates caused by the stampede led to a further spate of bankruptcies as domestic values of dollar-denominated debt skyrocketed. Attempts by central banks to shore up their currencies through raising interest rates failed to stem the outflow and further exacerbated the disaster, causing even more bankruptcies, with borrowers unable to meet higher interest charges.
What we are witnessing is a repeat of the nineties. This time it was China that attempted to ride the dragon, pegging its currency against the Dollar and amassing vast foreign reserves in order to suppress appreciation of the Yuan and boost exports. The Chinese economy benefited enormously from the vast trade surplus with the US, but those who live by the dragon die by the dragon. Restrictions on capital inflows into China may dampen the reaction, compared to the 1997 crisis, but are unlikely to negate it. The market will have its way.
Financial markets in the West are cushioned by floating exchange rates which act as an important shock-absorber against fluctuations in financial markets. The S&P 500 fell 13.5% in 1990 but only 3.5% in October 1997. The ensuing collapse of the ruble and failure of LTCM, however, caused another fall of 9.0% a year later. Not exactly a crisis, but unpleasant all the same.
North America
The domestic US economy slowed in the past few months but increased spending on light motor vehicles and housing suggested that robust employment growth would continue. Upheaval in financial markets (and exports) now appears likely to negate this, leading to a global market down-turn.
The S&P 500 breached primary support at 1980, signaling a primary down-trend. The index has fallen 4.5% from its earlier high and presents a medium-term target of 1830*. Decline of 13-week Twiggs Money Flow below zero would confirm the signal but descent has been gradual, suggesting medium-rather than long-term selling pressure.
* Target calculation: 1980 + ( 2130 – 1980 ) = 1830
The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) spiked upwards indicating rising market risk.
Bellwether transport stock Fedex broke primary support at $164, confirming the primary down-trend signaled by 13-week Twiggs Money Flow reversal below zero. The fall warns of declining economic activity.
Canada’s TSX 60 broke primary support at 800, confirming the earlier bear signal from 13-week Twiggs Momentum reversal below zero. Target for a decline is 700*.
* Target calculation: 800 – ( 900 – 800 ) = 700
Europe selling
Germany’s DAX broke medium-term support at 10700. Expect further medium-term support at 10000 but reversal of 13-week Twiggs Money Flow below zero warns of selling pressure. Breach of 10000 would indicate a test of primary support at 9000.
* Target calculation: 10700 – ( 11800 – 10700 ) = 9600
The Footsie broke 6450, signaling a test of primary support at 6100. Reversal of 13-week Twiggs Money Flow below zero warns of (long-term) selling pressure. Breach of 6100 would offer a target of 5000**.
* Target calculation: 6450 – ( 6800 – 6450 ) = 6100 **Long-term: 6000 – ( 7000 – 6000 ) = 5000
Asia
The Shanghai Composite reflects artificial, state-backed support at 3500. Declining 13-week Twiggs Money Flow warns of long-term selling pressure. Withdrawal of government support is unlikely, but breach of 3400/3500 would cause a nineties-style collapse in stock prices.
* Target calculation: 4000 – ( 5000 – 4000 ) = 3000
Japan’s Nikkei 225 appears headed for a test of 19000. Breach would test primary support at 17000 but, given the scale of BOJ easing, respect is as likely and would indicate further consolidation between 19000 and 21000. Gradual decline of 13-week Twiggs Money Flow suggests medium-term selling pressure.
* Target calculation: 21000 + ( 21000 – 19000 ) = 23000
India’s Sensex is holding up well, with rising 13-week Twiggs Money Flow signaling medium-term buying pressure. Breakout above 28500 is unlikely but would indicate another test of 30000. Decline below 27000 would warn of a primary down-trend; confirmed if there is follow-through below 26500.
Australia
Commodity-rich Australian stocks are exposed to China and emerging markets. The only protection is the floating exchange rate which is likely to adjust downward to absorb the shock — as it did during the 1997 Asian crisis. 13-Week Twiggs Money Flow below zero warns of (long-term) selling pressure on the ASX 200. Breach of support at 5150 is likely and would confirm a primary down-trend. Long-term target for the decline is 4400*. Respect of primary support is unlikely, but would indicate consolidation above the support level rather than a rally.
Does a Dead Kazakh KGB Chief Own Sherlock’s House? – The Daily Beast
From Michael Weiss:
…..“These wealthy oligarchs all come to London because it’s a really good place to put your money,” Simon Farrell QC, a British attorney who specializes in corporate crime and money laundering, told The Daily Beast. “It’s a fantastic place to hold property because it’s a secure democracy where the rule of law is taken seriously, where the judiciary is not corrupt and where you can trust the legal profession. In many parts of the world the super-rich can’t be sure that their assets will be safe.”
Indeed, London has now earned the unflattering designation of the world’s No. 1 money-laundering capital, with an estimated $1 billion pouring in each month…..A stunning £122 billion in real estate in England and Wales is held be companies registered outside England and Wales, according to Global Witness….
Read more at Does a Dead Kazakh KGB Chief Own Sherlock’s House? – The Daily Beast.
Cold wind blows for crude oil producers
Long-term June 2017 Nymex Light Crude futures (CLM2017) broke support at $60/barrel, offering a target of $54/barrel*.
* Target calculation: 60 – ( 66 – 60 ) = 54
In the short-term, September 2015 futures (CLU15) are testing support at their March low of $50/barrel. Breach is likely, given the long-term down-trend, and would offer a target of $40/barrel*.
* Target calculation: 50 – ( 60 – 50 ) = 40
Declining prices will hurt the Energy sector in the short/medium-term, but the benefit to the broader economy will outweigh this in the longer term. Lower fuel prices will especially benefit the Transport sector. Highly industrialized exporters like Germany, Japan, China and the broader EU, will also benefit. While oil exporters like Russia, Iran, the Middle East, Nigeria, Angola, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Norway, face hard times ahead.
Global economy: No surprises
The global economy faces deflationary pressures as the vast credit expansion of the last 4 decades comes to an end.
Commodity prices test their 2009 lows. Breach of support at 100 on the Dow Jones UBS Commodity Index would warn of further price falls.
The dramatic fall in bulk commodity prices confirms the end of China’s massive infrastructure boom.
Crude oil, through a combination of increased production and slack demand has fallen to around $60/barrel.
Falling prices have had a sharp impact on global Resources and Energy stocks….
But in the longer term, will act as a stimulus to the global economy. Already we can see an up-turn in the Harpex index of container vessel shipping rates, signaling an increase in international trade in finished goods.
The latest OECD export statistics show who the likely beneficiaries will be. Primary producers like Brazil and Russia have suffered the most, while finished goods manufacturers like China and the European Union display growth in exports. The US experienced a drop in the first quarter of 2015, but should rebound provided the Dollar does not strengthen further.
Australia and Japan offer a similar contrast.
Oil-rich Norway (-5.8%,-13.3%) has also been hard hit. Primary producers are only likely to recover much later in the economic cycle.
How much longer can the global trading system last? | Michael Pettis
Michael Pettis quotes a Brazilian economist on the dilemna facing the US:
….As the US becomes a declining share of the globalized world, the costs of imposing stability (and I have no illusions that this is done for charity) rise, and its share of the benefits decline. It is only a matter of arithmetic that at some point the costs will exceed the benefits.
Pettis describes how other countries have gamed the system – notably Germany and France in the 1960s, Japan in the 1980s, and China in the 2000s – and argues that the costs to the US already outweigh the benefits.
….Many economists may disagree with me that the costs of the current role the US plays in the global trade regime exceeds the benefits, but the point of this essay is to show that even if I am wrong, as long as the world grows faster than the US, more of the world is incorporated into the global trading system, and more countries design growth models that suppress domestic consumption in order to subsidize domestic growth, there must of necessity be a point at which it makes sense for the US to opt out of its role as shock absorber, and – by raising tariffs, intervening actively in the currency, restricting foreign purchases of US assets and especially US government bonds, or otherwise reducing capital inflows – become simply one more member of a system with no automatic adjustment process.
The current system, in other words, is inherently unstable and will sooner or later force the US economy into a position of choosing either to take on excessive risk or to abdicate its role as shock absorber….
Sustained current and capital account imbalances are unhealthy except for the few rare instances where capital-rich economies invest or loan money to a capital-poor recipient. In most cases capital is used to purchase secure Treasury investments in the US in order to offset a domestic current account surplus. This has a destabilizing effect not only on the US economy, which has shed millions of manufacturing jobs and created a housing bubble of epic proportions, but on the global economy as a whole, destroying any benefit to the perpetrator.
Read more at How much longer can the global trading system last? | Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS.
Liquidity Mismatch Helps Predict Bank Failure and Distress
Liquidity mismatch compares the saleability (liquidity) of a bank’s assets to the stability of its funding. Assets such as cash and Treasury bonds are highly saleable and one can expect a ready market even in times of crisis. Residential mortgages are less liquid, but still saleable at a discount, while development and construction loans may prove unsaleable at any price when the market is under stress.
In terms of funding, long-term deposits offer stability but are far more expensive than short-term wholesale sources and call deposits. The latter, however, are highly unstable and were instrumental in the collapse of Northern Rock (UK) and Washington Mutual (US) during the global financial crisis (GFC).
The challenge facing bank regulators is to monitor liquidity mismatch to ensure bank health. The more illiquid and speculative the assets are, the more stable (illiquid) the bank’s funding sources must be to avoid a liquidity crisis during a market down-turn.
Liquidity mismatch =
(Liquidity-weighted liabilities – Liquidity-weighted assets) / Total assets
This paper by J.B. Cooke, Christoffer Koch and Anthony Murphy at the Dallas Fed (Liquidity Mismatch Helps Predict Bank Failure and Distress) suggests that large banks suffer from higher levels of liquidity mismatch and that liquidity mismatch is as important as capital ratios in determining bank health:
Precrisis Rise in Mismatch
Liquidity mismatch rose significantly between 2002 and 2007. The median level of mismatch climbed about 6 percentage points. Most of this rise was driven by changes in liquidity-weighted assets rather than liquidity-weighted liabilities. Banks pursued higher returns on riskier, less-liquid assets. To a lesser extent, banks relied less on stable core deposits and more on “unstable” wholesale funding. The rise in liquidity mismatch before the financial crisis is noteworthy because equity capital (as a percentage of assets)—the ultimate buffer against losses—changed little. The rise in mismatch was faster and more persistent at the largest banks, representing the top 25 percent of institutions (Chart 2). Among those banks, the median mismatch rose about 8.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2007, while at the 25 percent representing the smallest banks, the increase was only 3 percentage points.Early-Warning Sign?
Bank regulators look for early-warning signs of distress. Is liquidity mismatch one? Comparing the fourth quarter 2007 mismatch levels of commercial banks that failed or became distressed in 2008 or 2009 with those that did not may provide an indication. The average levels of liquidity mismatch for the two groups were significantly different. Failed or distressed banks generally had much higher levels of liquidity mismatch, as shown by the final entry in the liquidity mismatch row of Table 1.
While the timing of the changes in liquidity mismatch (as seen in Chart 2) and the difference in levels of mismatch at any one time (as seen in Table 1) suggest that liquidity mismatch is important, they do not necessarily imply that a rise in liquidity mismatch helps predict future bank failure or distress. Higher levels of liquidity mismatch may be correlated with lower levels of equity capital and higher proportions of brokered deposits and construction and land development loans as well as with nonperforming assets or lower returns on assets—all well-known predictors of failure or distress.
Modeling Failure and Distress
Statistical models were used to disentangle the effects of changes in liquidity mismatch from the effects of changes in equity capital and the other predictors of bank failure and distress between 2006 and 2011.9 This period was chosen because it followed a time when there were very few failures or cases of distress, the early 2000s. Failure or distress up to two years ahead was considered. For example, fourth quarter 2007 data were used to predict failure or distress any time in 2008.10 The results suggest that recent failure and distress rates are explained or predicted by many of the same factors as in 1985–92, when large numbers of commercial banks and savings and loans failed. These factors include too little equity capital, a high ratio of nonperforming assets and a high share of construction and land development lending……Liquidity Mismatch Matters
Liquidity mismatch rose significantly before the financial crisis, especially at large banks, our research shows. The rise in mismatch contributed to the rise in bank failures and cases of distress. Liquidity mismatch helps predict bank failure or distress one year ahead, even accounting for equity capital and the other indicators at which regulators look.
Cooke is an economic analyst, Koch is a research economist and Murphy is an economic policy advisor and senior economist in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Hat tip to Barry Ritholz.
T-Bonds Burn, RBA Minutes Next
From Adam Button on AshrafLaidi.com:
…..The direction of the bond market in recent weeks has been a major driver but what was notable on Monday was the divergence. Bund yields were up 2.5 basis points while 10-year Treasury yields were up 9 bps.
This might be the start of a new stage for bonds. In the rout, everything was being thrown overboard but now market participants are looking through the wreckage to decide what’s worth keeping. Ultimately, the ECB is still buying 60 billlion euros of bonds per month and that may keep bund yields pinned, at least relatively.
Read more at T-Bonds Burn, RBA Minutes Next.