China’s export dilemna

Growth in value of exports from China has slowed to single figures since 2012. It will be difficult sustain current GDP growth if this trend continues.

China Exports

The Harper Petersen index of shipping rates for container vessels, the Harpex, remains near its 2010 low, reflecting continued weakness in Asian manufactured goods exports (a rise in exports from Europe or North America would be absorbed by the high percentage of containers returned empty to Asia on the round trip).

US Imports from China

Rising Australian bulk commodity exports reflect the disconnect between Chinese imports and exports, with vast investment in infrastructure and rising stockpiles of raw materials used to sustain economic growth. But diminishing marginal returns on further infrastructure and housing investment mean failed recovery of manufactured goods exports would lead to a hard landing.

Australian Bulk Commodity Exports

A key factor will be the strength of the RMB against the US Dollar. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests that China will meet strong resistance in its attempts to export its deflation to the West. Treasury’s forex report to Congress (April 2014) highlight’s sensitivity toward further exchange rate manipulation:

In China, the RMB appreciated during 2013 on a trade-weighted basis, but not as fast or by as much as is needed, and large-scale intervention resumed. The RMB appreciated by 2.9 percent
against the dollar in 2013. However, as a result of the depreciation of the yen and many emerging market currencies, the RMB strengthened more on a trade-weighted basis, with the RMB’s nominal and real effective exchange rates rising 7.2 and 7.9 percent, respectively. For most of 2013 the RMB exchange rate was at, or very near, the most appreciated edge of the daily trading band, suggesting continuous pressure for greater RMB appreciation. During 2014, however, the exchange rate has reversed direction, depreciating by a marked 2.68 percent year to date.

There are a number of continuing signs that the exchange rate adjustment process remains incomplete and the currency has further to appreciate before reaching its equilibrium value. China continues to generate large current account surpluses and attracts large net inflows of foreign direct investment; China’s current account surplus plus inward foreign direct investment in 2013 exceeded $446 billion. The reduction in the current account surplus as a share of China’s GDP has largely been the reflection of the unsustainably rapid pace of investment growth. Finally, China has continued to see rapid productivity growth, which suggests that continuing appreciation is necessary over time to prevent the exchange rate from becoming more undervalued. All of these factors indicate a RMB exchange rate that remains significantly undervalued. Further exchange rate appreciation would help to smoothly rebalance the Chinese economy away from investment toward consumption.

The Chinese authorities have been unwilling to allow an appreciation large enough to bring the currency to market equilibrium, opting instead for a gradual adjustment which has now been partially reversed . The expectation that the RMB would continue to appreciate over time resulted in large and increasing capital inflows in 2013. The PBOC’s policy of gradual adjustment triggered expectations of continued appreciation, and resulted in large-scale foreign exchange intervention. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased sharply in 2013, by $509.7 billion, which was a record for a single year. China has continued large-scale purchases of foreign exchange in the first quarter of this year, despite having accumulated $3.8 trillion in reserves, which are excessive by any measure. This suggests continued actions to impede market determination.

In short, China has been buying US Treasurys as a form of vendor financing, allowing them to export to the US while preventing the RMB from appreciating to its natural, market-clearing level against the Dollar. The fact that they are attempting to disguise this manipulation, using third parties, means that Congress is unlikely to tolerate further suppression of the RMB against the Dollar and will be forced to take action.

Is China hiding its FX reserves in...Belgium?

Feared sales of US Treasury investments by China, leading to a collapse of the Dollar, are most unlikely and would be a death knell for Chinese exports. Reversal of capital flows would cause rapid appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar, up-ending China’s former competitive advantage and boosting US exports.

Even without a reduction of existing Treasury holdings, appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar and Euro appears inevitable. This would be disastrous for China, causing them to forfeit their competitive advantage in export markets. And without access to the level of technology and global branding enjoyed by their Western counterparts, Chinese exporters are likely to struggle to hold existing markets, let alone achieve further growth. With diminishing returns on infrastructure and housing investment, China could soon run out of options to stimulate its economy. And its path as a global economic powerhouse may well follow that of its predecessor, Japan.

Putin’s strategy: Turning Russia into China’s Ukraine

What is starting to dawn on Vladimir Putin is that, in a free-market system, one is more beholden to one’s customers than to one’s suppliers. It is easier for customers to take their business elsewhere than for suppliers to do so.

China’s biggest customers are Europe and the United States. Russia is attempting to switch their customer from Europe to China. That would move them further down, not up, the supply chain. As Prof Timothy Snyder points out:

…Putin would have to fall back on China, and Russia would become China’s Ukraine.

China’s export dilemna

Growth in value of exports from China has slowed to single figures since 2012. It will be difficult sustain current GDP growth if this trend continues.

China Exports

The Harper Petersen index of shipping rates for container vessels, the Harpex, remains near its 2010 low, reflecting continued weakness in Asian manufactured goods exports (a rise in exports from Europe or North America would be absorbed by the high percentage of containers returned empty to Asia on the round trip).

US Imports from China

Rising Australian bulk commodity exports reflect the disconnect between Chinese imports and exports, with vast investment in infrastructure and rising stockpiles of raw materials used to sustain economic growth. But diminishing marginal returns on further infrastructure and housing investment mean failed recovery of manufactured goods exports would lead to a hard landing.

Australian Bulk Commodity Exports

A key factor will be the strength of the RMB against the US Dollar. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests that China will meet strong resistance in its attempts to export its deflation to the West. Treasury’s forex report to Congress (April 2014) highlight’s sensitivity toward further exchange rate manipulation:

In China, the RMB appreciated during 2013 on a trade-weighted basis, but not as fast or by as much as is needed, and large-scale intervention resumed. The RMB appreciated by 2.9 percent
against the dollar in 2013. However, as a result of the depreciation of the yen and many emerging market currencies, the RMB strengthened more on a trade-weighted basis, with the RMB’s nominal and real effective exchange rates rising 7.2 and 7.9 percent, respectively. For most of 2013 the RMB exchange rate was at, or very near, the most appreciated edge of the daily trading band, suggesting continuous pressure for greater RMB appreciation. During 2014, however, the exchange rate has reversed direction, depreciating by a marked 2.68 percent year to date.

There are a number of continuing signs that the exchange rate adjustment process remains incomplete and the currency has further to appreciate before reaching its equilibrium value. China continues to generate large current account surpluses and attracts large net inflows of foreign direct investment; China’s current account surplus plus inward foreign direct investment in 2013 exceeded $446 billion. The reduction in the current account surplus as a share of China’s GDP has largely been the reflection of the unsustainably rapid pace of investment growth. Finally, China has continued to see rapid productivity growth, which suggests that continuing appreciation is necessary over time to prevent the exchange rate from becoming more undervalued. All of these factors indicate a RMB exchange rate that remains significantly undervalued. Further exchange rate appreciation would help to smoothly rebalance the Chinese economy away from investment toward consumption.

The Chinese authorities have been unwilling to allow an appreciation large enough to bring the currency to market equilibrium, opting instead for a gradual adjustment which has now been partially reversed . The expectation that the RMB would continue to appreciate over time resulted in large and increasing capital inflows in 2013. The PBOC’s policy of gradual adjustment triggered expectations of continued appreciation, and resulted in large-scale foreign exchange intervention. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased sharply in 2013, by $509.7 billion, which was a record for a single year. China has continued large-scale purchases of foreign exchange in the first quarter of this year, despite having accumulated $3.8 trillion in reserves, which are excessive by any measure. This suggests continued actions to impede market determination.

In short, China has been buying US Treasurys as a form of vendor financing, allowing them to export to the US while preventing the RMB from appreciating to its natural, market-clearing level against the Dollar. The fact that they are attempting to disguise this manipulation, using third parties, means that Congress is unlikely to tolerate further suppression of the RMB against the Dollar and will be forced to take action.

Feared sales of US Treasury investments by China, leading to a collapse of the Dollar, are most unlikely and would be a death knell for Chinese exports. Reversal of capital flows would cause rapid appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar, up-ending China’s former competitive advantage and boosting US exports.

Even without a reduction of existing Treasury holdings, appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar and Euro appears inevitable. This would be disastrous for China, causing them to forfeit their competitive advantage in export markets. And without access to the level of technology and global branding enjoyed by their Western counterparts, Chinese exporters are likely to struggle to hold existing markets, let alone achieve further growth. With diminishing returns on infrastructure and housing investment, China could soon run out of options to stimulate its economy. And its path as a global economic powerhouse may well follow that of its predecessor, Japan.

Unhealthy diets greater threat to health than tobacco, says UN expert | Fox News

United Nations investigator said on Monday.

In a statement issued on the opening of the annual summit of the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations investigator, Belgian professor Olivier de Schutter calls for a global effort to tackle obesity:

“Unhealthy diets are now a greater threat to global health than tobacco. Just as the world came together to regulate the risks of tobacco, a bold framework convention on adequate diets must now be agreed,” he said.

…..In 2005, a U.N. convention on tobacco control aimed at reducing deaths and health problems caused by the product went into force after long negotiations under the umbrella of the WHO.

In a report to the rights council in 2012, de Schutter said a similar accord on food should include taxing unhealthy products, regulating food high in saturated fats, salt and sugar, and “cracking down on junk food advertising.”

Read more at Unhealthy diets greater threat to health than tobacco, says UN expert | Fox News.

Piketty Problems: Top 1% Shares of Income and Wealth Are Nothing Like 1917- 28 | Cato @ Liberty

From Alan Reynolds:

First of all, the Piketty and Saez estimates do not show top 1 percent income shares nearly as high as those of 1916 or 1928 once we use the same measure of total income for both prewar and postwar data.

Second, contrary to Summers, there is no data from Piketty, Saez or anyone else showing that the top 1 percent’s share of wealth “has risen sharply [if at all] over the last generation” – much less exhibited a “return to a pattern that prevailed before World War I.”

Dealing first with income, it is interesting that the first graph in Piketty’s book is about the top 10 percent – not the top 1 percent. Saez likewise writes that “the top decile income share in 2012 is equal to 50.4%, the highest ever since 1917 when the series start.” That is why President Obama said, “The top 10 percent no longer takes in one-third of our [sic] income – it now takes half.” A two-earner New York City family of six with a pretax income of only $110,000 would be in this top 10 percent, and they are certainly not taking “our” income. Regardless whether we examine the Top 10 percent or Top 1 percent, however, it is absolutely dishonest to compare the postwar estimates with prewar estimates.

The Piketty and Saez prewar estimates express top incomes as a share of Personal Income, after subtracting 20% to account for tax avoidance. Postwar estimates, by contrast, express top incomes as a share of only that fraction of income that happens to be reported on individual income tax returns – rather than being unreported, in tax-free savings or assets, or sheltered as retained corporate earnings.

Transfer payments are not counted as income in either series (as though federal cash and benefits were worthless); this distinction is inconsequential for the prewar figures but increasingly important lately. “Total income” as Piketty and Saez define it accounted for just 61.8 percent of personal income in 2012, down from 67 percent in 2000.

Read more at Piketty Problems: Top 1% Shares of Income and Wealth Are Nothing Like 1917- 28 | Cato @ Liberty.

How Hitler’s roads won German hearts and minds | VOX

Interesting conclusion from Hans-Joachim Voth and Nico Voigtländer, writing at VOX.

Long before the Nazi regime committed its singular crimes, it had become remarkably popular in Germany (Evans 2006). Voting records from 1933 and 1934 reveal the effect of one factor that, according to many historians, boosted support for the regime – the building of the Autobahn. Using detailed information on the geography of road-building, we isolate the effect of construction on voting behaviour by analysing the ‘swing’ in favour of the regime over a nine-month period (November 1933 to August 1934). We find that opposition declined much faster where the new ‘roads of the Führer’ ran.

Direct economic benefits for residents in Autobahn districts may have played a role, but they were probably small. More importantly, the new roads provided concrete proof of the regime’s actions, delivering on its promise to get ‘Germany moving again’. Within a couple of months of taking power, a highly ambitious highway construction project was under way at 17 different locations all over the country, affecting more than 100 electoral districts. In other words, the visible progress of road construction made the regime’s ability to follow through on its promises salient for many Germans.

Combined with effective propaganda trumpeting the regime’s successes, the roads succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of many Germans. Nor were they the only ones to be impressed. When the US Army rolled into Germany at the end of World War II, one of the officers taken with the ease of transport on motorways was Dwight D. Eisenhower. When he became President of the United States, he lead the initiative to built the country’s interstate highway system.

Read more at Nazi pork and popularity: How Hitler’s roads won German hearts and minds | vox.

What Ukraine Crisis Means for Future of Europe | SPIEGEL ONLINE

Interesting extract from Spiegel interview with Prof. Timothy Snyder from Yale:

SPIEGEL: What motivates Putin?

Snyder: I think Putin is playing an all-or-nothing game, geopolitically speaking. He no longer cares about tolerable relations with the EU or about a solid relationship with Ukraine. Putin has opted for something else, a much larger project, to destabilize Ukraine and the EU. It’s an all-or-nothing game because there is no going back, now that he has embarked on this path.

SPIEGEL: Can he win?

Snyder: There are two options now: Either he achieves his goals, or the European Union achieves political unity and ideological stringency. It would have to define itself as Russia’s adversary and, most of all, develop a joint energy policy with which it could affect Putin. If the EU could do that, there would be radical consequences for Russia. Then Putin would have to fall back on China, and Russia would become China’s Ukraine.

via Experts Discuss What Ukraine Crisis Means for Future of Europe – SPIEGEL ONLINE.