Russia & Former USSR Archives - Page 13 of 15

March 27, 2014

Vladimir Putin’s irrational behavior: Why the Russian president wins if we think he is crazy.

Scott Radnitz suggests that Vladimir Putin is not crazy — just deliberately acting that way.

….consider strategic theorist Thomas Schelling’s concept of the “rationality of irrationality.” This can be illustrated through the game of chicken, in which two drivers are heading for each other at full speed, and the first to swerve is the chicken. A driver who appears crazy enough to prefer dying over chickening out will always have the advantage. It is therefore rational for a player to convince his opponent that he is actually irrational.

March 26, 2014

Depleting Putin’s war chest

From Quartz:

The “First Law of Petropolitics,” coined by New York Times columnist Tom Friedman… states that when oil prices are high, the leaders of petro-states can become demanding and belligerent; when they are low, they are more prone to be pussycats.

Oil prices at elevated levels explain Russian belligerence. The graph below shows Brent Crude prices adjusted by the (US) consumer price index to reflect growth in real crude prices over the last decade. To bring crude prices down to pre-2005 levels will be no small feat.

Real Crude Oil Prices

March 23, 2014

George F. Kennan’s Prediction On NATO Expansion Was Right

Interesting argument against further expansion of NATO on Moon of Alabama:

George Kennan was the U.S. diplomat and Russia specialist who developed the cold war strategy of containment of the Soviet Union, though he later criticized its militaristic implementation. In 1998, when the Senate voted to extend NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Kennan was asked to comment. He responded:

“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” said Mr. Kennan from his Princeton home. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.”

…..”It shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.”

Read a full report of the 1998 interview with George Kennan at NY Times: Foreign Affairs | Thomas L Friedman.

March 22, 2014

Russia’s shrinking influence

Lorena O’Neil suggests that the number of Russian language speakers will halve from 300 million in 1990 to 150 million by 2025.

….countries that were traditionally bound to Russia by language, culture, energy and ethnicity are starting to gain independence, and relationships with other countries like China are increasing……..[Paul] Goble suggests that Putin will continue to engage in bombast with his neighbors because he’s playing an extremely weak hand that is getting weaker. “In a sense, the thuggishness that Putin is using (on) his neighbors is a product of the weakening of Russia’s cultural influence.”

March 14, 2014

Polish Foreign Minister Discusses Weak EU Position in Ukraine Crisis | SPIEGEL ONLINE

From a Der Spiegel interview with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski:

SPIEGEL: Why are the Poles so highly engaged in this conflict?

Sikorski: The Ukrainians are our neighbors. They are fighting for the same things we did back in 1989 – for a country that is more democratic, less corrupt and is European.

March 12, 2014

How Ukraine Can Move Forward | Cato Institute

Dalibor Rohac at the Cato Institute suggest the Ukraine should focus on getting its economy back on track:

….to really understand where Ukraine is headed, it’s important to understand the roots of the unrest that led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych.

First, the country’s oligarchic elite, which ruled the country for the past two decades, cared little about the prosperity of ordinary Ukrainians. The evidence is not just in the tacky mansions of President Yanukovych and his men, but also in the fact that the average income in Ukraine is roughly one third of that in Poland even though both countries started from around the same point in 1990.

Second, the change of government in Ukraine follows a miscalculation on the part of the Kremlin, which long considered Ukraine as its client state, dependent on imports of natural gas from Russia. Ukrainians simply lost patience after their government effectively followed instructions from Moscow and canceled the broadly popular association agreement with the EU. Now that the plan to bully Ukrainians into submission has backfired, Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to leverage the situation to push claims to parts of Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine — most prominently Crimea and the port of Sevastopol.

Regardless of whether such territorial concessions become a reality, with an interim cabinet in place and a new presidential election scheduled for late May, it is time for Ukraine to reckon with the massive governance failure of the past twenty years.

The best response to Putin’s land grab would be to turn Ukraine into an economic success story and example to its large neighbor to the East.

March 11, 2014

Sanctions nerves ripple through Moscow | FT.com

The Financial Times quotes Igor Yurgens, a former Kremlin adviser:

He added that capital flight was likely to soar. He said his bank had received “a huge number of calls” into his bank’s Swiss offices from Russian clients over the past two weeks and a number of wire transfers into Swiss bank accounts out of Russia. Clients, he said, would prefer to keep money outside the country despite the risk of asset freezes.

March 8, 2014

China will never support Putin on Crimea

Offering the people of Crimea a referendum — on whether to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation — may appeal to Vladimir Putin but he should not expect support from China. For two very simple reasons: Hong Kong and Taiwan. China claims these two territories as part of China, but there are no prizes for guessing the outcome if a similar referendum (to secede) were held in either territory.

March 8, 2014

Europe’s Five Deadly Sins on Ukraine | Carnegie Europe

Jan Techau of Carnegie Europe writes:

….In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about the Kremlin’s fears of Western encirclement. He has declared that EU and NATO enlargement are part of a conspiracy to destroy Russia, that Ukraine is not really a sovereign nation, and that Western agents provocateurs were behind Ukraine’s 2004–2005 Orange Revolution.

Amid all that rhetoric, the West failed to recognize that Putin was deadly serious. Such talk was dismissed either as cheap propaganda or as the mild lunacy of a handful of overideologized true believers. Nobody imagined that Putin himself really believed his own bluster.

But for the Russian president, the fight over Ukraine is not an imperialistic adventure, it is a fight for survival against a mortal Western enemy. Just because observers in the West know that’s nonsense, that doesn’t mean that others think the same. Such Western projections were finally debunked when German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked to U.S. President Barack Obama on March 2 that Putin was “in another world.”

March 8, 2014

Recession time for Russia | The Market Monetarist

Lars Christensen at The Market Monetarist writes:

….. sharply increased geo-political tensions in relationship to Putin’s military intervention on the peninsula of Crimea has clearly shocked foreign investors who are now dumping Russian assets on large scale. Just Monday this week the Russian stock market fell in excess of 10% and some of the major bank stocks lost 20% of their value on a single day.

In response to this massive outflow the Russian central bank – foolishly in my view – hiked its key policy rate by 150bp and intervened heavily in the currency market to prop up the rouble on Monday. Some commentators have suggested that the CBR might have spent more than USD 10bn of the foreign currency reserve just on Monday. Thereby inflicting greater harm to the Russian economy than any of the planned sanctions by EU and the US against Russia.

By definition a drop in foreign currency reserve translates directly into a contraction in the money base combined with the CBR’s rate hike we this week has seen a very significant tightening of monetary conditions in Russia – something which is likely to send the Russian economy into recession (understood as one or two quarters of negative real GDP growth).