Testimony before U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
\nBy Eugene B. Rumer, Senior Fellow and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
\nMarch 30, 2017<\/p>\n
….To understand why the Russian government is engaged in this large-scale and diversified
\ninfluence operation, which blends overt and covert activities, one needs to step back and put it in
\nthe context of events of the quarter century since the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\nEvery country\u2019s foreign policy is a product of its history, its geography, and its politics. Russia is
\nno exception to this rule, and to understand the pattern of Russian behavior at home and abroad,
\nwe need to look at Russian history, Russian geography, and Russian domestic politics.<\/p>\nWar in Europe is integral to the formative experience of every Russian. The country\u2019s national
\nnarrative is impossible without the record of two wars\u2014the Patriotic War of 1812, which Russians
\nview as a war of liberation from Napoleon\u2019s invasion of Russia, and the Great Patriotic War of
\n1941-1945. Both wars were fought to liberate Patria, the Fatherland, from foreign occupiers. In
\n1812, Napoleon entered Moscow and the city was burned. In 1941, Hitler\u2019s armies were stopped
\njust outside the city limits of Moscow. Americans, too, had their war of 1812, and Washington too
\nwas burned, but few Russians know or remember it, just as they think little of the fighting in the
\nPacific theater against Japan in the second world war. Stalin\u2019s armies didn\u2019t enter it until nearly
\nthe very end, three months after the war in Europe ended. The end of the Great Patriotic War is
\ncelebrated in Russia every year as a great national holiday on May 9. The greatest Russian novel
\nof all times is Leo Tolstoy\u2019s War and Peace, all Russians read it in high school. They are also
\ntaught in history classes that their country\u2019s greatest accomplishment of the 20th century was the
\ndefeat of fascism in the Great Patriotic War.<\/p>\nThe war of 1812 ended for Russia when the armies of Tsar Alexander I entered Paris in 1814. The
\nGreat Patriotic War ended in 1945 when Stalin\u2019s armies entered Berlin. From 1945 to 1989, when
\nthe Berlin Wall came down, Russia was at its most secure, or so successive generations of Russian
\nleaders have been taught to believe. The history and the strategy taught in Russian military
\nacademies for decades after it ended were the history and the strategy of the Great Patriotic War.
\nThe map for tabletop exercises at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 2001 was a giant
\nmap of the European theater. U.S. strategists were by that time \u201cdone\u201d with Europe and shifting
\ntheir focus from the Balkan edge of the continent to South Asia and the Middle East. Russia was
\nnot \u201cdone\u201d with Europe.<\/p>\nLittle appreciated in the West at the time was the trauma suffered by the Russian national security
\nestablishment when it lost its outer and inner security buffers\u2014the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
\nempire. The sense of physical security afforded by this dual buffer between NATO\u2019s armies and
\nthe Russian heartland was gone. Russian declaratory policy may have been to sign on to the 1990
\nCharter of Paris as the Cold War ended, but the historical legacy and the geography of Russian
\nnational security could not be altered with the stroke of a pen. Even as the Communist system was
\ndismantled and the Soviet Union disbanded, Russia\u2019s national security establishment, which had
\nbeen brought up for generations to think in terms of hard power, could not and did not embrace the
\nnew vision of European security based on shared values.<\/p>\nIn 1991, with their society in turmoil, their economy in tatters, their military in retreat from the
\nouter and inner empires, and their country literally falling apart, Russian leaders had no choice but
\nto go along with that vision. They also accepted as given that history is written by the victors, and
\nthat the victors would also make the rules for the new era. Russia would have to go along with it
\nfor as long as it remained weak.<\/p>\nThe 1990s were a terrible decade for Russia. Its domestic politics remained in turmoil, its
\neconomy limped from one crisis to the next, and its international standing\u2014only recently that of a
\nsuperpower\u2014collapsed. Western students of Russia were entertaining the prospect of a world
\nwithout Russia. It was not lost on Russian political elites that the 1990s were also a time of great
\nprosperity and global influence for the West. For them, brought up on the idea of importance of
\nhard power, the dominance of the West was inextricably tied to its victory in the Cold War, the
\ndefeat of Russia, its retreat from the world stage, and the expansion of the West in its wake.<\/p>\nRussia Is Back <\/strong><\/p>\n
But Russia would not remain weak indefinitely. Its economic recovery after the turn of the
\ncentury, buoyed by soaring global prices for commodities and hydrocarbons, and its domestic
\npolitical consolidation around Vladimir Putin and his brand of increasingly authoritarian
\nleadership, so different from the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, have laid the groundwork for a return
\nto Russia\u2019s more assertive posture on the world stage.<\/p>\nThat increasingly assertive posture has manifested itself on multiple occasions and in different
\nforms over the past decade and a half\u2014in Vladimir Putin\u2019s speech at the Munich Security
\nConference in 2007; in the war with Georgia in 2008 and the statement in its aftermath by then-
\npresident Dmitry Medvedev about Russia\u2019s claim to a sphere of \u201cprivileged interests\u201d around its
\nperiphery; and finally in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the undeclared war in eastern
\nUkraine to keep Ukraine from slipping from Russia\u2019s orbit.<\/p>\nFor the West, Russia\u2019s return to the world stage has been nothing more than pure revanchism. It
\nviolates the basic, core principles of the post-Cold War European security architecture\u2014which
\nRussia pledged to observe over a quarter-century ago.<\/p>\nFor Russia, it is restoring a balance\u2014not the old balance, but some semblance of it. Currently,
\nNATO troops are deployed to deter Russian aggression against Estonia. (Curiously, former
\nspeaker of the House Newt Gingrich has described it as the \u201csuburbs of St. Petersburg.\u201d) Russia\u2019s
\nsecurity establishment views this commitment by NATO countries to its vulnerable ally as a threat
\nto the heartland.<\/p>\nThe narrative of restoring the balance, correcting the injustice and the distortions of the 1990s,
\nwhen the West took advantage of Russia\u2019s weakness, has been the essential element of Russian
\nstate-sponsored propaganda since the beginning of the Putin era. Whether or not we choose to
\naccept this narrative, these beliefs undergird Russia\u2019s comeback on the world stage and political
\nconsolidation at home. In public and private, top Russian officials proclaim that the wars in
\nGeorgia and Ukraine were fought to prevent Western encroachment on territories vital to Russian
\nsecurity. The military deployment in Syria merely restores Russia\u2019s traditional foothold in the
\nMiddle East, from which Russia withdrew when it was weak, and where it was replaced by the
\nWest with consequences that have been tragic for the entire region.<\/p>\nIn domestic politics, Putin\u2019s authoritarian restoration is treated by the majority of average and elite
\nmembers of Russian society as the return to the country\u2019s traditional political health, free from
\nforeign interference in its political and economic life. The more pluralistic system and dramatic
\ndecline of the 1990s are linked in this narrative to the influence of the United States and other
\nforeign interests in Russia\u2019s economy and politics, to their desire to introduce alien values in
\nRussia\u2019s political culture and take Russia\u2019s oil. U.S. support for Russian civil society is an effort to
\nundermine the Russian state, to bring Russia back to its knees, and take advantage of it, both at
\nhome and abroad. Western economic sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of its annexation of
\nCrimea and the undeclared war in eastern Ukraine are a form of warfare designed to weaken
\nRussia and gain unfair advantage over it. Western support for democracy in countries around
\nRussia\u2019s periphery is an effort to encircle it and weaken it too.<\/p>\nThis narrative has dominated the airwaves inside Russia, where the Kremlin controls the
\ntelevision, which is the principal medium that delivers news to most Russians. With independent
\nmedia in retreat and alternative sources of information marginalized, this narrative has struck a
\nresponsive chord with many Russians. The narrative has been effective because it contains an
\nelement of truth\u2014Russia did implode in the 1990s, and the West prospered; Russia did recover
\nfrom its troubles and regained a measure of its global standing on Putin\u2019s watch; the West did
\npromote democracy in Russia, which coincided with its time of troubles; and the West has been
\ncritical of the Russian government\u2019s retreat from democracy as Russia regained strength.<\/p>\nMoreover, foreign policy traditionally was and is the preserve of the country\u2019s political elite and
\nits small national security establishment. Whereas there are some voices inside Russia who, like
\nthe leading anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, have challenged the many domestic failings
\nand authoritarian leanings of the Putin government, there are hardly any who have challenged its
\nforeign policy record. Worse yet, the Kremlin propaganda has been apparently so effective, and
\nthe legal constraints imposed by it so severe, that few Russian opposition voices dare to challenge
\nthe government\u2019s foreign policy course for fear of being branded as foreign agents, enemies of the
\npeople, and fifth columnists.<\/p>\nWarfare by Other Means<\/strong><\/p>\n
For all the talk about Russian recovery and resurgence on the world stage, its capabilities should
\nnot be overestimated. Its GDP is about $1.3 trillion vs. U.S. GDP of over $18 trillion. The Russian
\neconomy is not \u201cin shambles,\u201d but in the words of a leading Russian government economist it is
\ndoomed to \u201ceternal stagnation\u201d unless the government undertakes major new reforms.<\/p>\nRussian defense expenditures are estimated at about $65 billion, or little more than President
\nTrump\u2019s proposed increase in U.S. defense spending for FY 2018. The Russian military is
\nestimated at just over 750,000\u2014well short of its authorized strength of one million\u2014vs. U.S. 1.4
\nmillion active duty military personnel.<\/p>\nBy all accounts, the Russian military has made huge strides in the past decade, benefiting from far-
\nreaching reforms and generous defense spending. It is undeniably far superior militarily to its
\nsmaller, weaker neighbors and enjoys considerable geographic advantages in theaters around its
\nperiphery.<\/p>\nYet, the overall military balance does not favor Russia when it is compared to the United States
\nand its NATO allies. They have bigger economies, spend more on defense, have bigger, better
\nequipped militaries, and are more technologically sophisticated. A NATO-Russia war would be an
\nact of mutual suicide, and the Kremlin is not ready for it. Its campaign against the West has to be
\nprosecuted by other means.<\/p>\nThat is the backdrop for the subject of today\u2019s hearings. Since Russia cannot compete toe-to-toe
\nwith the West, its leaders have embraced a wide range of tools\u2014information warfare in all its
\nforms, including subversion, deception, dis- and mis-information, intimidation, espionage,
\neconomic tools, including sanctions, bribery, selective favorable trading regimes, influence
\ncampaigns, etc. This toolkit has deep historical roots in the Soviet era and performs the function of
\nthe equalizer that in the eyes of the Kremlin is intended to make up for Russia\u2019s weakness vis-\u00e0-
\nvis the West.<\/p>\nIn employing this toolkit, the Kremlin has a number of important advantages. There is no domestic
\naudience before which it has to account for its actions abroad. The Kremlin has few, if any
\nexternal restraints in employing it, and its decisionmaking mechanism is streamlined. There is no
\nlegislature to report to, for the Duma is a rubber stamp body eager to sign off on any Kremlin
\nforeign policy initiative.<\/p>\nThe circle of deciders is far smaller than the Soviet-era Politburo, and it is limited to a handful of
\nPutin associates with similar worldviews and backgrounds. They are determined to carry on an
\nadversarial relationship with the West. They can make decisions quickly and have considerable
\nresources at their disposal, especially given the relatively inexpensive nature of most of the tools
\nthey rely on. A handful of cyber criminals cost a lot less than an armored brigade and can cause a
\ngreat deal more damage with much smaller risks.<\/p>\nShame and reputational risks do not appear to be a factor in Russian decision-making. In early-
\n2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov did not shy away from repeating a patently false
\nfake media story about the rape of a Russian-German girl by a Syrian asylum-seeker in Germany.<\/p>\nMoreover, a version of selective naming and shaming\u2014or targeting of political adversaries with
\nfalse allegations of misconduct\u2014has been used by Russian propaganda to discredit political
\nadversaries in the West. Russian propaganda, and Putin personally, have sought to deflect the
\nattention from the fact of the intrusion into the DNC server and the top leadership of Hillary
\nClinton\u2019s presidential campaign to the information released as a result of it that has presented
\nvarious political operatives in an unfavorable light.<\/p>\nThis not only deflects the attention from Russia\u2019s role in this episode, it helps the Kremlin convey
\nan important message to its domestic audience about the corrupt nature of U.S. politics. Russia
\ntherefore is no worse than the United States, which has no right to complain about corruption and
\ndemocracy deficit in Russia.<\/p>\nRussian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election is likely to be seen by the Kremlin as a
\nmajor success regardless of whether its initial goal was to help advance the Trump candidacy. The
\npayoff includes, but is not limited to a major political disruption in the United States, which has
\nbeen distracted from many strategic pursuits; the standing of the United States and its leadership in
\nthe world have been damaged; it has become a common theme in the narrative of many leading
\ncommentators that from the pillar of stability of the international liberal order the United States
\nhas been transformed into its biggest source of instability; U.S. commitments to key allies in
\nEurope and Asia have been questioned on both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific. And last, but
\nnot least, the Kremlin has demonstrated what it can do to the world\u2019s sole remaining global
\nsuperpower.<\/p>\nIt Is Not a Crisis, It Is the New Normal <\/strong><\/p>\n
Events of the past three years, since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, have been referred to as a
\ncrisis in relations between Russia and the West. However, this is no longer a crisis. The
\ndifferences between Russia and the West are profound and are highly unlikely to be resolved in
\nthe foreseeable future without one or the other side capitulating. The U.S.-Russian relationship is
\nfundamentally broken, and this situation should be treated as the new normal rather than an
\nexceptional period in our relations. For the foreseeable future our relationship is likely to remain
\ncompetitive and, at times, adversarial.<\/p>\nThe full extent of Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election is not yet publicly known.
\nBut the melding of various tools (e.g, the use of cyber operations to collect certain information
\ncovertly) and the provision of this information to outlets such as Wikileaks and the news media
\nwas certainly a first. Unfortunately, it is not a first for U.S. allies and partners in Europe and
\nEurasia. It is not the last either. Just a few days ago, Vladimir Putin received France\u2019s right-wing
\npresidential candidate Marine Le Pen in the Kremlin. Previously, her National Front had received
\na loan from a Moscow-based bank, and Russian media outlets have tried to injure the reputation of
\nher chief opponent Emmanuel Macron by spreading rumors about his sexuality and ties to
\nfinancial institutions. The chiefs of British and German intelligence services have warned publicly
\nabout the threat from Russia to their countries\u2019 democratic processes. The Netherlands recently
\nchose to forego reliance on certain computer vote tabulation systems due to elevated fears of
\nRussian interference and hacking.<\/p>\nThe experience of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. election should be judged an unqualified
\nsuccess for the Kremlin. It has cost it little and paid off in more ways than can be easily counted.
\nTo be sure, U.S. officials should expect it to be repeated again and again in the future. 2016 was a
\ncrisis, but it was not an aberration and should be treated as the new normal. Cyber is merely a new
\ndomain. Deception and active measures in all their incarnations have long been and will remain a
\nstaple of Russia\u2019s dealings with the outside world for the foreseeable future.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n